Is India Using Trade Deals to its Benefit?

Data from the Department of Commerce provides important information about how India's trade with partner countries is changing. Along with this insight, the data clearly indicates that India didn't start its efforts on trade diversification, both in destination and number of goods, only after Donald Trump became President of the US for the second time; India was making efforts even before his first term.

India was already signing a number of trade deals with partner countries in the last decade as and when India could, but the data suggests that those trade deals were not converting into favourable trade numbers for India as far as the export and trade deficit numbers are concerned. Even the call for ‘Make in India’ couldn’t convert into favourable trade numbers. However, the efforts have now started converting into results post the success of the targeted PLI scheme. India has started improving its position on the account of trade deficit from $122 billion in 2021-22 to $94.6 billion in 2024-25. In 2011-12, the trade deficit was about $123 billion against a total trade of $778 billion. India’s overall trade increased significantly during the period. Total trade increased from $1.47 trillion in 2021-22 to $1.74 trillion in 2024-25.

India signed trade agreements with Australia and the UAE in 2022. India-Australia goods trade rose from an average of about $13 billion in FY2020–21 to $23 billion in FY2025–26, a 76% increase, while Indian exports doubled from $4 billion to $8 billion annually. So, with Australia, India has improved its export numbers more than the growth in total trade. India-UAE goods trade increased from $55 billion to $100 billion, an 81% rise, with Indian exports rising from $22 billion to $36 billion. In this increase, the share of oil and gas plays an important role.

The trade data with these two countries clearly indicates that the trade deals haven’t helped improve India’s external trade imbalance. The trade deficit with Australia has more than doubled to about $7 billion from $3 billion. Similarly, with the UAE, the trade deficit has also increased by more than 190% from about $33 billion to $64 billion during the period. However, what is interesting to note is that Australia’s share of India’s total trade remained around 2%, while the UAE’s increased only from roughly 7% to 8%.

In the long to medium term, if India sustains this positive development, it will release some undue pressure on the Indian Rupee, making it more competitive in the foreign exchange market. If the rupee strengthens in the future relative to other currencies, the overall impact on the domestic economy is expected to be positive. India will be less vulnerable to geopolitical disturbances. The financial market in general and the capital market in particular will become less volatile. The risk of imported inflation will go down while making imports cheaper. However, if the rupee strengthens, it will make exports less attractive.

Trade agreements are useful and important. But there remains a pertinent question: Are trade agreements sufficient to improve India's external trade imbalance? Sustained export competitiveness requires domestic reforms in land, labour, power, water, and judicial processes. Agreements create market access; structural reforms determine whether India can exploit it.

So, rather than asking how many trade deals India has entered into with partner countries in the last decade, we need to ask how these trade deals can benefit India and improve the external trade imbalance. India needs to respond at the policy and execution level internally before it enters into any trade deals to exploit the possible benefits arising from the trade deals. Prior preparation is key to success.

Dr Rajeev K Upadhyay

India's Monetary Policy Is Being Set in Three Markets, Not One

The Indian economy has become more integrated with global capital, trade and financial markets. This is directly impacting the market dynamics in India. Monetary policy is no exception. India’s monetary policy is no longer the subject of one market, but is being shaped in three markets. In reality, it never was. The money market, foreign exchange market and bond market have been shaping India’s monetary policy simultaneously.

The Money Market

Liquidity is the real policy variable. RBI's operating framework is designed in such a way that it keeps the weighted average call rate (WACR) close to the policy repo rate to avoid any liquidity mismatch. This looks good in the textbooks, but the reality is almost always different. When bank system has surplus liquidity, the repo rate alone does not tell the full story. In early September, banking-system surplus liquidity rose to about ₹11.6 lakh crore. The RBI first responded with Variable Rate Reverse Repo (VRRR) operations and then moved to outright bond sales. The message is clear. Liquidity itself has become one of the monetary policy variables.

 

 

This is not new at all. Rather, it is old economics but with new numbers. Money is never neutral in the short run. Too much of it leads to asset bubbles. Too little brings stagnation. India is now in the middle of this dilemma. Despite the RBI absorbing over ₹8 lakh crore through multiple VRRR auctions, there remains about ₹7 lakh crore of surplus liquidity. This surplus money has to be managed in such a way that it improves operations in the money market and monetary policy transmission. Basically, liquidity is a policy variable now.

The Foreign Exchange Market

The second market that directly affects monetary policy is the foreign exchange market. The special USD-INR swap facility, including $127.23 billion through FCNR(B) deposits, has mobilised $136.38 billion by August 31. These inflows have strengthened India's external position, and forex reserves have increased to about $781 billion. But these inflows through the USD-INR swap facility and FCNR (B) deposits also create rupee liquidity. The RBI received these dollars and released rupees into the banking system, overloading banking system liquidity. Here foreign exchange management enters the domain of monetary policy. Here is the irony. A weaker rupee leads to increased import costs, including oil and other inputs, resulting in worsening inflation and the trade balance. On the other hand, surplus liquidity normally softens the short-term market rates.

 

 

 

The impossible trinity, as suggested by the Mundell-Fleming model, is a real situation. The RBI is dealing with that impossible trinity, where it needs to choose between capital mobility, exchange rate stability and monetary autonomy. India has chosen capital mobility and exchange rate stability through capital inflows under the USD-INR swap facility and FCNR (B), and by defending the rupee against the US dollar. The RBI has now constrained monetary autonomy.

The Government Bond Market

The third market is the government bond market, which is subject to monetary policy. The RBI is selling government bonds worth ₹1 lakh crore in Open Market Operations (OMO) sales. The response to the first tranche of OMO sales of ₹50,000 crore on September 17 was overwhelming, with bids of ₹66,590 crore. This response by financial institutions itself tells the story of surplus liquidity in the banking system. Government securities are not another asset class on the balance sheets of banks. Rather, these government securities are the indicator of confidence and benchmark price of rupee money for the wider economy. However, OMO sales are tricky too. Through OMO sales, excess liquidity is easily absorbed, but yields also rise, impacting monetary policy transmission. The 10-year government bond yield is part of the monetary transmission story.

 
The OMO sales announcement has forced the 10-year bond yield to hit 7 per cent after three months. This will affect long-term investment decisions and the cost of capital for the government while affecting the entire yield curve. Interest rates should respond to inflation and output gaps, but exchange rates and capital inflows do have a role to play in the monetary policy transmission story. The WACR is the operating target, and OMOs and FX swaps can be used to manage durable liquidity.

The Integrated Framework: One Policy, Three Dimensions

RBI cannot treat the repo rate, the rupee and the bond yield separately. They are on the same plate and have to be dealt with together, and this is the biggest monetary policy question RBI is facing. India needs a more integrated operating framework in which capital mobility (liquidity) management, foreign exchange management and bond-market conditions are assessed together. This is necessary to keep financial conditions stable enough to protect growth, while preventing external shocks from becoming domestic inflation or financial instability. This is going to become a regular situation as India grows economically and becomes more integrated with global markets.

The trilemma is real in an open economy like India. India has chosen its position. Now India’s macroeconomic management should ensure that the surplus liquidity from forex inflows is drained without spiking bond yields, while the exchange rate remains stable without sacrificing monetary policy autonomy and credibility. Growth must be protected while keeping inflation within the threshold.

The future policy challenge for India is to successfully manage these markets together without allowing one instrument to undermine another. This is not today's inflation number or forex reserves but the next decades.

The Way Forward: Policy Coordination and Credible Communication

India is in a spiral of high food inflation. WPI in August was around 10%, and it will reflect in CPI numbers in September. It is now a tricky situation for India's aspirations. The possibility of the RBI raising policy rates in the October MPC is very high. The difference between policy rates and inflation has narrowed enough to breach the RBI’s threshold limit in the inflation numbers for September. Even a few-point rise in inflation will make real interest negative. So pressure on the RBI to increase interest rates is very high to avoid a situation of negative divergence between interest rates and inflation. At present, the Indian economy requires a low interest rate regime to sustain its growth and allowing inflation to eat that growth would prove costly for the economy.

 

At this hour, India needs to do a few things. First, the RBI must ensure that monetary policy does not chase food inflation. This job should be left to the government to use fiscal policy instruments to manage food inflation rather than to tame it. Food inflation simply cannot be tamed through interest rates. Second, India must prepare a plan for the coming decades rather than for a quarter or year. High food inflation in India is a structural problem, as it has become a regular phenomenon at intervals. This doesn’t need a tactical but a structural response.

 

 

Third, the RBI should integrate the three markets into one policy framework and publish a quarterly financial conditions index integrating liquidity, exchange rates and bond yields. This will shift the central bank’s vision from one dimension to three dimensions. Fourth, the RBI must coordinate with the government on forex management. The swap facility and FCNR (B) deposits succeeded beyond imagination but created domestic liquidity problems. The RBI must plan for the consequences before they happen, as this will now become a regular occurrence at intervals.

India's financial integration is a strength. But the monetary policy must now integrate the three dimensions along with the fiscal policy. In such times, when fiscal policy focuses on growth and demands low interest rates and monetary policy is forced to increase interest rates to stabilise prices, the chances for stand-off between fiscal policy and monetary policy increase. History is replete with such incidents. Here lies the national interest.

 

Dr Rajeev K Upadhyay

Why Zero MDR on RuPay Debit Cards?

Merchant Discount Rate (MDR) is the fee paid by merchants for accepting digital payments. This has been there in India since Visa and MasterCard entered India. Different payment networks charge at different rates across payment instruments. Credit cards generally charge higher MDR than that of debit cards. MDR on Visa and Mastercard credit cards range from 1.5% to 2.5%, while American Express credit cards charge from 2% to 3.5%. Indian payment network RuPay-issued credit cards charge zero MDR on transactions valued up to ₹2000, and for transactions above ₹2000 the charges range from 0% to 2% depending on the transaction type and value. Debit cards have relatively lower rates, with Visa and Mastercard typically between 0.4% and 0.9%. RuPay debit transactions have 0% MDR.

For UPI, there is an MDR of 0.4% on P2M transactions above ₹2000 to be paid by merchants, which is capped at ₹300. P2M transactions up to ₹2000 have zero MDR. For P2P transactions, MDR is zero. Other special provisions apply to small merchants, essential services, and capital-market transactions. Overall, the structure shows how MDR varies by payment method, transaction type and regulatory framework, with the objective of balancing digital-payment adoption, merchant costs and financial inclusion.

Post the arrival of RuPay in the scene, things have dramatically changed. RuPay has expanded exponentially as it charges the lowest rates. Despite MDR on P2M transactions above ₹2000, the MDR on UPI is still significantly lower than that of the foreign payment networks. Most importantly, MDR on RuPay debit cards is zero while Visa MasterCard and AmEx charge between 0.4-3.5% depending on the instrument. So, without doubt, India’s RuPay network is still the cheapest among all available options in India. However, zero MDR on RuPay debit cards is interesting, and it seems that the government wants to anchor some specific behavioural changes in Indian citizens. Perhaps the government is worried about the rising credit card culture, which is leading to a huge rise in the personal loans category, which has made the RBI worried. However, lower MDR on debit cards don’t reflect in the prices of goods and services. So if the government is concerned about rising personal debts, the benefit of zero MDR must pass on to consumers, which at present is limited to businesses only.

Household debt is more than 45.5% of GDP. Non-household debt has risen to 58.4% of total household debt. Non-household debt includes personal loans, credit card outstandings, consumer durable & BNPL (Buy Now, Pay Later) loans, vehicle loans and gold loans. The share of housing and business loan in household loans has fallen to 26.3% and 15.3%. This change in the nature of debt may be a cause of concern in future. So, RuPay issued debit cards can be used to change this behavior. By passing the benefits of zero MDR on Rupay debit cards to consumers might be a very small effort in this direction.

Dr Rajeev K Upadhyay

Is Human psychology a mystery?

Is Human psychology a mystery?

A person might feel satisfied standing outside an Apple Store for hours, starting at midnight, just to get a mobile phone that could otherwise be delivered to their doorstep in a matter of minutes or hours in this time of instant delivery apps. To them, this arduous wait might feel like a festival. Standing outside the store for hours might seem like an integral part of the product experience itself! They might perceive it however they please, and this very ordeal could even feel like a significant achievement! Yet, this same individual is often in a state of constant urgency in their daily life! They are always in a rush and want everything done immediately! A delay or inconvenience of even a few minutes feels so intolerable to them that they fly into a rage!

The human mind is truly beyond comprehension. People often prefer the voluntary servitude of their own desires over the prospect of unwanted freedom!

Who could stop someone from succeeding if they truly understood this aspect of human nature?

Dr Rajeev K Upadhyay

India's First 'A' Rating: Can Monetary Policy Sustain It?

Japanese credit rating agency Japan Credit Rating (JCR) has upgraded India’s sovereign rating from BBB+ to A-. India’s entry into the A-rated sovereign club is not just a technical upgrade or symbolic, but a verdict on India’s policy evolution over two decades, the country’s growth, fiscal management and policy credibility. But the real test of that credibility is not coming from credit rating agencies but from how India responds to the persistent inflation shock in the economy. There looms a critical question now: Can India and the RBI’s monetary policy sustain this momentum? Or will it become the very factor that undermines our newly won credibility?
The Rating Upgrade Decoded

JCR has upgraded India's sovereign credit rating to 'A-' from 'BBB+', with a stable outlook. It is a historic moment for India as it took about two decades to upgrade from BBB+ to A-. With this, India has formally entered the ‘A’ band. Solid economic growth, effective and deliverable economic policies and an improved financial system are the key drivers of this rating upgrade.

Numbers have played the most important role in this upgrade. In FY26, GDP grew at 7.7%. Q1 GDP growth has been 7.8%, which is the fastest among emerging economies, and FY27 is expected to remain above the RBI’s estimate of 6.7% growth, supported by reduced personal income tax and GST rate reduction. The government is working on bringing the debt-to-GDP ratio down from 56.1% to 50% in FY27. The fiscal deficit is projected to be 4.3% to 4.5% during the period. However, on the negative side, the current account deficit has widened to $4.2 billion from $3.4 billion in the quarter ending June 2026, which is 0.5% of GDP. But at the same time, on account of RBI’s FCNR(B) success, India’s foreign exchange reserves have increased to more than $780 billion. 

What does it mean for the Economy?

A sovereign rating upgrade from BBB+ to A- will be beneficial for the whole economy, with stronger external account perception. This upgrade will lead to a fall in External commercial borrowing (ECB) costs in the coming months. It is expected that it will attract foreign portfolio investments (FPI) to government securities and help enhance the rupee’s stability in the market. It will be easier for the state governments as well as public sector enterprises to raise debt with sovereign guarantees at a lower cost.

 

The RBI's Policy Dilemma

RBI is facing a critical policy dilemma. Indian economy is growing and needs a low-interest-rate regime, but inflation, particularly food inflation, is headstrong, and the RBI may be forced to increase interest rates to tame inflation. The RBI, at present, maintains the repo rate at 5.25% with a neutral stance, with a target of 4% inflation within threshold of 2-6% band. However, inflation has been rising for the last 4 months in a row, and Q3 inflation is projected at 5.9% by the RBI, which is primarily driven by food and oil prices. As a result, the RBI may raise the repo rate by 50-75 basis points.

If the RBI tightens monetary policy, it would be a classic policy overreaction: using monetary policy tools to tame food inflation - a battle monetary policy can hardly win. The RBI aggressively tried to tame inflation in 2011-13 and 2022-23, but failed. However, as a consequence of rate hikes, capital expenditure and growth in the economy slowed down. So the RBI should distinguish persistent demand-driven inflation from temporary supply-driven inflation before responding with rate hikes.

High interest rates will cool demand-pull inflation, but do little to address supply-side food price shocks driven by monsoons, supply chains, or global commodity cycles. Core inflation remains subdued, suggesting that the inflationary pressure is concentrated in food and fuel. These are the areas where fiscal policy holds the levers, not monetary policy.

So at this juncture of time, if the RBI tightens monetary policy by increasing interest rates by 50-75 basis points in the second half of FY27, it risks choking the very 7%+ growth which has helped India to earn the 'A-' rating in the first place. India stands at a paradox: the growth that won the upgrade may be at risk of the policy response to inflation that growth itself helps generate.

 

International Parallels: Lessons from Indonesia and Brazil

Before India, many countries have faced a similar dilemma. Indonesia’s rating was upgraded to BBB- in 2011, which resulted in huge FDI inflow and a stock market rally, followed by commodity-driven inflation. But Indonesia held rates steady rather than overreacting to temporary inflation spikes, allowing the economy to grow at 6%+. Later in 2017, Indonesia’s credit rating was upgraded to BB+. However, Brazil overreacted to a spike in inflation to 10% in 2021. GDP growth fell from 4.8% in 2021 to 3% in 2022. During this period, Brazil aggressively increased interest rates from 2% to 13.75% to combat food and fuel inflation, which could bring inflation down from 10% to 5.70%. Brazil illustrates the growth costs that can accompany aggressive monetary tightening during an inflation shock. In 2023-24, Vietnam also experienced commodity-driven inflation. But instead of using monetary policy tools, it used fiscal policy tools to tame inflation. Rather, the State Bank of Vietnam decreased policy rates by 100 basis points to improve GDP growth from 5% in 2023 to 7% in 2024. The lesson for India is not that interest rates should always be cut during inflation, but that the policy instrument should match the source of the inflation.

 

Policy Implications

In the second half of 2027, the Indian economy is expected to surpass the RBI’s GDP projections if key policy rates don’t move in the wrong direction under inflationary pressures. So, the RBI’s October Monetary Policy Committee meeting must tread water carefully and focus on growth-friendly stability over inflation obsession. Rather, at this juncture, India should aspire to sustain a high-growth trajectory well above 7% rather than allowing a temporary inflation shock to shake to put economy to a 5- 6% growth trajectory, and the critical enabler for this is fiscal-monetary policy coordination. The RBI as well as the government should be aligned. The RBI keep a stable stance, and the government uses fiscal tools responsibly to expand public distribution system coverage and release buffer stocks strategically to tame food inflation, while keeping on adjusting import duties and export bans on key food items.

The JCR upgrade is a vote of confidence, but at the same time, this confidence is fragile. The RBI's October MPC meeting will be a test. I hope the RBI choose growth-friendly stability over inflation obsession.

The JCR upgrade is a vote of confidence in the credibility of its institutions. It rewards a combination of growth, fiscal credibility and institutional policy that has strengthened the economy over the past two decades. That confidence should not be mistaken for a licence to ignore inflation. But neither should a temporary supply-side inflation shock trigger an aggressive monetary response that weakens the very growth engine behind the upgrade. India's A-rated moment will ultimately be sustained not by choosing between growth and stability, but by getting the policy mix between the two right.

 

Dr Rajeev K Upadhyay 

It’s not the Right Time for MDR on UPI

MDR on UPI has become a household topic, polarising India. Some claim MDR is beneficial, while others express dissatisfaction. Many are asking how long UPI will remain free. Charges are natural. Others are asking when other freebies will be stopped. Every side has some fair points. MDR on UPI, like any decision, does have some benefits for the economy. But on the other side, it will also negatively affect people and the economy.

MDR on UPI does have some positive impacts on the economy. It will make the UPI ecosystem sustainable and competitive in the medium to long term. The annual cost of operating, scaling and maintaining UPI infrastructure is about INR 20,000 crores. Not only this, the business was not profitable for operators, so the businesses were not investing much in cybersecurity, innovation and system upgrades. MDR on UPI will make the business competitive, and more investment will flow into cybersecurity, innovation and system upgrades. This will also help in improving UPI infrastructure in rural areas. So on these counts, the MDR on UPI is beneficial.

It should be noted that UPI cannot be treated as a freebie. Rather, it is an economic enabler which is helping in creating an ecosystem that revolves around the digital economy. This costly free economy is a 'positive discrimination' which is helping increase financial inclusion and formalise the economy. Once, on 15th October, this MDR on UPI becomes a reality, it will have many negative consequences for the economy. It will lead to increased use of cash, indirect inflation and a pushback for growth-stage small retailers.

It is significant that merchant payments account for roughly two-thirds of the total transaction value processed via UPI in India. This means that while the 0.4% charge won't apply to that 67% share, it will apply to a substantial portion, and merchants and most probably manufacturers will ultimately pass this cost on to consumers by increasing the margins for the sellers. The implication is clear: prices of all goods, mainly in the FMCG sector, will rise, potentially by several percentage points.

Recall that when the government reduced GST rates, consumers did not actually reap much benefit. At least in the FMCG sector, consumers clearly didn't. Companies quietly raised pre-tax prices by making marginal adjustments to product quantities while continuing to sell goods at the same old price points.

It is worth noting that these price hikes will occur at a time when the economy is already grappling with inflation. This impact will be reflected in the inflation figures for November. The US Federal Reserve has already exerted pressure on the rupee and inflation by raising interest rates; consequently, the Reserve Bank's Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) will be compelled to raise domestic interest rates during its October meeting.

It is still unclear what plans the government has to address the negative effects of MDR on UPI. But MDR on UPI is going to negatively affect a large number of small merchants if they continue accepting payment through UPI. This may lead to a large number of merchants slowly stopping accepting payments through UPI or asking for split payments.

Imposing MDR on UPI is not wrong. If not today, one day it was destined to happen. But the timing is not appropriate.

Dr Rajeev K Upadhyay

WPI and CPI Becomes Sticky in India

Inflation in India is becoming sticky. In August 2026, CPI inflation rose to 4.82%, while food inflation climbed to 5.95%. WPI inflation neared double digits at 9.92%, showing that price pressures are no longer limited to consumers and are spreading through production chains, which will eventually be passed on to consumers. Though CPI remains within the RBI's inflation threshold, inflation's headstrong turn suggests it may soon breach the limit, and the RBI may opt to raise interest rates.

This is not merely a monetary problem. India’s food supply remains vulnerable to monsoons, weak storage, fragmented markets, external shocks due to fuel dependency and, most importantly, speculation. The RBI cannot solve these structural constraints by raising interest rates or by using monetary policy instruments.

The solution to this structural problem lies in the hands of the government. The government must invest in logistics, irrigation and competitive agricultural markets (agriculture reforms), along with bringing down the dependency on imports to plug the problem of imported inflation and shocks.

India's Trade with BRICS Nations

BRICS is now just a forum for talk, but it is a structural reality for India. And India doesn’t sit at its centre by accident but by design. The number of member countries has increased from 5 in 2006 to 11, plus 10 partner countries. BRICS now commands nearly 40% of global GDP, 26% of global trade, and about half of the planet's population. So this bloc is not a simple multilateral forum but has the economic gravity of a very big continent. However, India runs a trade deficit of more than $200 billion with the BRICS nations, while India’s trade with the USA and Europe is more favourable. The USA is the largest trade partner of India, with which India has a huge trade surplus. So, a section of India is asking about the relevance of India’s membership in BRICS and the benefits that India drive from the exercise over two decades. While many already have prejudices, many fear the dominating presence of China in the group. These questions and prejudices are not uncalled for. The stark trade data and China's moves makes these questions relevant. 

Q1 GDP Growth: Not the Numbers but Methodology

The first estimate of Q1 FY 2027 real GDP growth is 7.8%. It's not just a number; it's a fact and a statement. A statement that India’s growth engine, contrary to the gloom peddled by certain quarters, remains robust, resilient, and fundamentally sound. But in polarised India, this data has become a new battleground. Everything relating to GDP growth is now revolving around narratives rather than economics. We're having intense discussions, but we haven't yet addressed the economics and the process through which GDP estimates are calculated. It must be noted that the GDP estimate in India is revised five times over a period of three years. And the GDP numbers released by the Indian Government are the first estimate. That means it will be revised again and again to ensure that there remain the least possible errors and duplicities.

The controversy was sparked by former Finance Secretary Subhash Chandra Garg’s claim that growth was merely 2.6%, which rests on a statistical fallacy so elementary that it does not need any debunking! To arrive at his growth numbers, he compared nominal GDP figures from two incompatible series: the old 2011-12 base year and the new 2022-23 base year. It must be noted that the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MoSPI) has made it very clear from day one: the Q1 FY26 nominal GDP was revised from ₹86.05 lakh crore under the old series to ₹80 lakh crore under the new series. So mathematically, the 10.3% nominal and 7.8% real growth stand unchallenged.

India's Economy: Mixed Signals

The Indian economy stands at a stage in its economic cycle where it is uncertain about its future trajectory. One survey indicates an uptick in private sector activity, while another points to a slowdown in industrial output growth. RBI data reveals that India's total foreign exchange reserves have hit an all-time high of $730 billion, with FCNR(B) deposits exceeding $65 billion. Yet, another survey suggests that GDP growth is decelerating, alongside rising inflation.

The Indian economy is sending mixed signals. Due to its reliance on external sources to meet its needs, the economy is becoming trapped in a spiral where the path forward is unclear. In this scenario, uncertainty will persist until government economic policies and increased investments by major business houses align in the same direction. However, there is another aspect to consider: private capital seeks both growth and security simultaneously. Ultimately, the direction lies in the government's hands.